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Introduction
Spanish. Bestow great attention on this, and endeavor to ac-
quire an accurate knowledge of it. Our future connec-
tions... will render that language a valuable acquisition.1
With the wave of anti-immigrant sentiment swelling throughout
the United States, the campaign to make English the Nation's official
language is gathering support among the populace as well as stimulat-
ing the antennae of congressional leaders. English-only supporters
believe granting the English language official status will promote na-
tional unity and political stability and protect public confidence by
eliminating the divisive influence of foreign language and culture.2
Seventeen states already have some type of English-only statute on
the books,3 and twelve others have English-only bills pending in the
Legislature.4 While prior efforts to establish English as the official
1. THE LIw AND SELECrED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 398 (Adrienne Koch
et al. eds., 1993).
2. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996). Interestingly, the English language is "itself a smorgasbord
(Swedish) of words borrowed from foreign tongues." Gerald Parshall, A 'glorious mon-
grel,' U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 25, 1995, at 48. For example, a girl can be fair
(Anglo-Saxon), beautiful (French) or attractive (Latin), while a bully may evoke fear (An-
glo-Saxon), terror (French) or trepidation (Latin). See id.
3. See ALA. CONsT. amend. 509; ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-4-117 (Michie 1996); CAL.
CONST. art. III, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30a; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 9; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 50-3-1 (Michie 1996); HAW. CONST. art. XV, § 4; ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 460, para. 20 (1996);
IND. CODE ANN. § 1-2-10-1 (Bums 1996); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (Baldwin 1996);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 3-3-31 (1996); NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 27; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 145-12
(1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-02-13 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-696 (Law. Co-op.
1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-404 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.1 (Michie 1996); and
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 8-6-101 (Michie 1996).
4. See A.B. 3017, 1995-1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995-1996); H.B. 47,76th Leg., 2nd
Sess. (Iowa 1995); H.B. 2157, 76th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Iowa 1995); H.B. 772, 88th Leg., 2nd
Sess. (Mo. 1996); S.B. 665, 88th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Mo. 1996); A.B. 290, 207th Leg., 1st Sess.
(N.J. 1996); S.B. 97,207th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1996) A.B. 2432,219th Leg., 2nd Sess. (N.Y.
1996); A.B. 6153, 219th Leg., 2nd. Sess. (N.Y. 1996); S.B. 938, 219th Leg., 2nd Sess. (N.Y.
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national language have failed,5 a sharply divided House of Represent-
atives (259-169) passed a bill on August 1, 1996, which could establish
English as the Nation's official language and prohibit the federal gov-
ernment from doing much business in other languages.6 These stat-
utes raise constitutional issues regarding whether a state has the
power to require the exclusive use of the English language by its
employees.
In November 1988, the citizens of Arizona adopted a ballot initia-
tive amendment to the Arizona Constitution entitled "English as the
Official Language,"7 thereby approving what is arguably the most re-
1996); H.B. 2054, 45th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 1996); H.B. 793, 179th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa.
1995-1996); S.B. 1216, 179th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1995-1996); S.B. 2241, 1996 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (R.I. 1996); H.B. 772, 99th Leg., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 1995); S.B. 128, 99th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Tenn. 1995); H.J.R. 4214, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1996); S.J.R. 8209, 54th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 1996); H.B. 2378, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1996); S.B. 147, 1996 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1996); A.B. 688, 92nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1995-1996).
5. See H.R.J. Res. 81, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess. (1989); SJ. Res. 13, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987).
6. See H.R. 123, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). President Clinton has threatened to
veto the measure if it passes the Senate. Mike Doming, House Clears English-Only Mea-
sure After Emotional Debate, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1996, at N3.
7. The initiative was sponsored by Arizonans for Official English. The statute reads,
in pertinent part:
1. English as the Official Language; Applicability
Section 1.
(1) The English language is the official language of the State of Arizona.
(2) As the official language of this State, the English language is the language of
the ballot, the public schools and all government functions and actions.
(3)(a) This Article applies to:
(i) the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government,
(ii) all political subdivisions, departments, agencies, organizations, and in-
strumentalities of this State, including local governments and
municipalities,
(iii) all statutes, ordinances, rules, orders, programs and policies.
(iv) all government officials and employees during the performance of
government business.
2. Requiring This State to Preserve, Protect and Enhance English.
Section 2.
This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall take all reasonable steps
to preserve, protect and enhance the role of the English language as the official
language of the state of Arizona.
3. Prohibiting this state from using or requiring the use of languages other than
English; exceptions.
Section 3.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2):
(a) This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English
and in no other language.
(b) No entity to which this Article applies shall make or enforce a law, order,
decree or policy which requires the use of a language other than English.
(c) No governmental document shall be valid, effective or enforceable unless
it is in the English language.
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strictive of the state provisions regulating language rights.8 That new
provision, Article XXVIII of the Arizona Constitution ("Article
XXVIII"), provides in essence that English shall be the official lan-
guage of the State of Arizona, all of its political subdivisions, and all
government officials and employees during the performance of gov-
ernment business.'
At the time the initiative passed into law, Maria Kelly Yniguez
was an employee of the Arizona Department of Administration,
where she processed medical malpractice claims asserted against the
state. Yniguez, who is bilingual and frequently communicated in a
combination of Spanish and English while performing her official du-
ties, ceased speaking Spanish to claimants after the passage of Article
XXVIII, fearing the new provision made her vulnerable to discipli-
nary action by her employer.10
Subsequently, in November 1988, Yniguez sought an injunction
against state enforcement of Article XXVIII and a declaration that it
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution." The district court upheld Yniguez's First Amendment
challenge, ruling that Article XXVIII infringed on Yniguez's right to
(2) This State and all political subdivisions of this State may act in a language
other than English under any of the following circumstances:
(a) to assist students who are not proficient in the English language, to the
extent necessary to comply with federal law, by giving educational instruction
in a language other than English to provide as rapid as possible a transition to
English.
(b) to comply with other federal laws.
(c) to teach a student a foreign language as a part of a required or voluntary
educational curriculum.
(d) to protect public health and safety.
(e) to protect the rights of criminal defendants or victims of crime.
ARiz. CoNsr. art. XXVIII.
8. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 927 (1996); see also
Note, English Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle in the States Over Language
Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 337 (1991). For example, Article XXVIII would bar
judges performing weddings from saying Mazel Tov, and prevent Arizona state universities
from issuing diplomas in Latin or recognizing graduates as summa cum laude. See Yniguez,
69 F.3d at 932.
9. See Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727,729 (9th Cir. 1991) affd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990) affd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1994),
and vacated, 53 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1995), and reh'd en banc, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir.), and cert
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996). The provision does, however, allow the use of languages
other than English. See supra note 7.
10. See Yniguez 69 F.3d at 924.
11. See id at 925.
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free speech and was facially overbroad. 12 Governor Mofford, an out-
spoken critic of Article XXVIII, did not appeal the district court's
judgment. Arizonans for Official English, the principal sponsor of the
ballot initiative which eventually became Article XXVIII, intervened
on the state's behalf and appealed to the Ninth Circuit.13 A three-
judge panel affirmed the district court decision,14 but the decision was
withdrawn pending further consideration en banc. 15 In Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English,'6 a majority of the en banc panel af-
firmed the district court, concluding that Article XXVIII of the Ari-
zona Constitution is facially overbroad in violation of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.17
Yniguez presents a significant but rarely examined issue in consti-
tutional law concerning the status of language rights and a state's
power to restrict such rights among government employees.' 8 Resolv-
ing such language rights issues, however, is anything but an easy task.
One of the most difficult challenges that the Yniguez court faced was
the highly semantic classification of the type of speech actually regu-
lated by English-only provisions as this classification determines
which level of scrutiny these provisions must survive to be upheld as
constitutional. Unfortunately, because of the nature of language
rights cases, numerous classifications could arguably apply. For exam-
ple, some argue that speaking a foreign language implicates the very
essence of pure speech itself, and thus is afforded full First Amend-
12. See Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309. On February 6, 1990, the district court dismissed all
of the defendants from the suit except Mofford.
13. See Yniguez, 42 F.3d 1217.
14. See id
15. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 53 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1995).
Whether Yniguez and Arizonans for Official English have sufficient standing to challenge
and defend Article XXVIII, respectively, was not fully addressed by the en banc panel,
although questions of standing in this case raise significant constitutional issues in them-
selves. See infra note 17. For purposes of this Comment, however, it is assumed both
parties met the standing requirement.
16. 69 F.3d 920.
17. See id at 924. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in March 1996 and is ex-
pected to hear arguments beginning in its October 1996 term. See id. at 920. The Court
also requested the parties submit briefs addressing Arizonans for Official English's stand-
ing and whther there is a case or controversy with respect to Yniguez. See Doming, supra
note 6.
18. The issue has not been examined by the Supreme Court since the Court struck
down laws restricting the use of non-English languages in the 1920s. See Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a state law forbidding teaching of any modem
language other than English in schools to any child who has not passed eighth grade vio-
lated Fourteenth Amendment due process); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (holding
that a state law requiring use of English as medium of instruction in all secular subjects in
all schools violated due process).
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ment protection; others believe the choice to speak a non-English lan-
guage is mere conduct-a nonverbal, conscious decision to speak a
certain way-thereby limiting constitutional protection; still others be-
lieve that the use of non-English languages is a means of expression,
simply a mode or manner implemented in the course of communica-
tion, much akin to wording and tone of voice.19 The issue in this case
is made even more complex by the fact that Yniguez is a public em-
ployee, whose on-the-job speech has traditionally been interpreted as
calling for separate analysis in and of itself.
Adjudicating the constitutionality of Article XXVIII undoubt-
edly raises difficult questions. Unfortunately, the Yniguez majority
failed to resolve any of them. In its conclusion, the majority failed to
clearly state what type of speech "language rights" implicate.2" This
failure was compounded by the majority's inability to set forth the
applicable standard of law for evaluating state restrictions on language
rights.21 This Comment argues that the majority's failure arises from
three primary errors: (1) focusing the threshold inquiry on the filu-
sory categorization of language rights as either pure speech or expres-
sive conduct; (2) misapplying the overbreadth doctrine; and (3)
misapplying the public employee speech doctrine to Yniguez's speech
by concentrating on an otherwise irrelevant public versus private con-
cern content distinction.
The first Part of this Comment briefly examines the Yniguez
opinion, evaluating the lines of analysis employed and conclusions
reached by the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part II
focuses on speech categorization, critically examining the various clas-
sifications applied by the panel to language rights. Part III evaluates
the various standards examined by the majority in light of case prece-
dent, focusing particularly on what, if any, precedential value can be
gleaned from this decision. Finally, Part IV offers the author's propo-
sal for the best line of analysis applicable to both the overbreadth
challenge of Article XXVIII as well as to Yniguez's speech
specifically.
19. See infra Part II (discussing different classifications considered by the Yniguez
court).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.A-B.
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I. The Yniguez Opinions
The District Court held that Article XXVIII was substantially
overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. 2 As such, the dis-
trict court did not reach the plaintiff's claims that Article XXVIII also
violates the Fourteenth Amendment,' 3 thereby limiting appellate re-
view to Yniguez's First Amendment overbreadth challenge. 4
A. The Majority Opinion
Judge Reinhardt's opinion for the majority25 essentially repub-
lished the three-judge panel decision withdrawn when the case was
selected for rehearing en banc, 26 adding only a few changes that ad-
dressed intervening Supreme Court cases.27 Reinhardt focused on the
classification of the speech interest at issue as well as the applicable
standard of review.
Despite the contention of Arizonans for Official English that
"choice of language.., is a mode of conduct"-a "nonverbal expres-
sive activity"2 undertaken to symbolically communicate an idea much
akin to burning draft cards or flags for expressive reasons 2 9-- Rein-
hardt concluded that "[s]peech in any language is still speech, and the
decision to speak in another language is a decision involving speech
alone."3 Reinhardt, while conceding that a person does make "an
22. See Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 316 (D. Ariz. 1990). Under the over-
breadth doctrine, a statute which is designed to burden or punish activities which are not
constitutionally protected may be invalidated if the scope of the statute includes activities
protected by the First Amendment. See Hill v. City of Houston, 764 F.2d 1156, 1161 (5th
Cir. 1985).
23. See Mofford, 730 F. Supp. at 316.
24. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting that Article XXVIH "will not be facially invalidated on overbreadth grounds un-
less its overbreadth is both real and substantial judged in relation to its plainly legitimate
sweep, and the provision is not susceptible to a narrowing construction that would cure its
constitutional infirmity"); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613-15 (1973).
25. Judge Reinhardt also wrote a colorful special concurrence directed at issues raised
by Judge Kozinski's dissent. The special concurrence did not raise issues relevant to this
Comment.
26. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1994).
27. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 924.
28. IcL at 934 (citing Appellant's Opening Brief at 15, 18 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992))).
29. See e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning American flag to symboli-
cally express protest of Reagan administrative policies); 'inker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing arm band to symbolically express protest
of hostilities in Vietnam); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning draft card
to symbolically express opposition to Vietnam War).
30. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 935-36.
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expressive choice by choosing to speak one language rather than an-
other,"'3 1 opined that "language, words, wording, [and] tone of
voice.., are not expressive conduct, but are simply among the com-
municative elements of speech."32 Reinhardt concluded that "[t]o call
a prohibition that precludes the conveying of information to
thousands of Arizonans in a language they can comprehend a mere
regulation of 'mode of expression' is to miss entirely the basic point of
First Amendment protections."33
Relying on Cohen v. California,34 the majority posited that
Yniguez's decision to speak in Spanish was identical to Cohen's choice
of language, as both implicated pure speech rights.35 In an accompa-
nying footnote, the Yniguez majority observed: "[T]o ignore the sub-
stance of speech and to look solely to form when analyzing the impact
of a prohibition on speech is to be wholly mechanical and artificial. 36
Judge Reinhardt, recognizing that the scope of Article XXVIII is
limited to persons performing services for the government and that
traditionally the government has a freer hand in regulating speech of
such employees than regulating that of private citizens, 37 then ex-
amined the constitutionality of the restrictions of Article XXVIII on
the pure speech rights of Arizona's employees. Despite recognizing
that government employee speech is entitled to greater constitutional
protection when the employee is speaking "as a citizen upon matters
of public concern," rather than on matters of private or personal inter-
est,38 the majority failed to state whether Yniguez's speech was of
31. Id. at 935.
32. Id
33. Id. at 936.
34. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the offensive-conduct conviction for wearing a
jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft" was unconstitutional because it rested
solely on speech, not conduct). See discussion infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text
(regarding the majority's application of Cohen).
35. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 935-36.
36. Id at 936 n.21.
37. See id. at 938; see also Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1866 (1994) (upholding
the firing of a nurse at a public hospital for disruptive statements made at work which were
critical of department); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (upholding dis-
charge of a public employee for expressing, in private conversation, hope that the Presi-
dent would be assassinated); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (upholding
termination of a public employee for circulating a questionnaire regarding office policy);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (upholding dismissal of a school
teacher for publishing a letter critical of school board).
38. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 939 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147).
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"public" or "private" concern.39 Judge Reinhardt boldly asserted that
"[t]his case does not... require us to attempt to resolve any broad,
general questions regarding the scope of government's authority to
regulate speech that occurs as part of an employee's official duties,"4
and justified this assertion by reasoning that although the "fact that
the speech occurs as a part of the performance of the employee's
job... affects the nature of our analysis... [it] does not necessarily
determine its outcome" in this case.41 Despite these clear assertions,
the majority subsequently muddled the issue by dropping a footnote
stating that speech in this case was closer to public concern content
than private.42
Building on recent Supreme Court decisions, the Reinhardt ma-
jority also considered the public's right to receive information in eval-
uating the constitutionality of Yniguez's speech, finding "public
employee speech doctrine weighs heavily the public's 'right to receive
information and ideas' by affording First Amendment protection to
speech that the public has an interest in receiving." 43
After examining the classification of Yniguez's speech, the Rein-
hardt majority identified three standards of review that could possibly
apply.44 However, the majority failed to establish clear, guiding pre-
cedent by concluding that "we need not decide what level of scrutiny
or what approach to balancing is applicable here... [as] the result is
the same [under all three tests]: The restrictions on free speech are
not justified by the alleged state interests." 45
In short, the majority reached the conclusion that Article XXVIII
restricted pure speech of public concern content. It determined that
the state interest in controlling the content and manner of employee
39. See id., 69 F.3d at 939; see also discussion infra Part II (concluding that even
though the speech did not clearly fit either category, Reinhardt opined that it seemed
closer to public than private concern).
40. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 939.
41. Id. at 940; see infra Part II.
42. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 939 n.23; see infra Part 11.
43. Id. at 942 (quoting United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct.
1003, 1015 (1995)); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983); Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968); Piver v. Pender County Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076,
1079-80 (4th Cir. 1987).
44. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 943-44 (evaluating the strict scrutiny test applied in Rutan
v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 70-76 & n.4 (1990), the balancing test applied in Waters
and Pickering and by the dissent in Rutan, and the "judicial inquiry" approach adopted in
National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. at 1015-18).
45. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 944.
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speech cannot outweigh the free speech interests impaired by Article
XXVIII.46
B. The Brunetti Concurrence
The concurrence of Judge Brunetti accepted the majority's con-
clusion that Article XXVIII was facially overbroad in violation of the
First Amendment.47 However, Judge Brunetti wrote separately to
emphasize that the restriction of Article XXVIII on the free commu-
nication of ideas between elected officials and the people they serve
was a sufficient reason in itself to strike down the provision.48 It is this
portion of Brunetti's opinion that the author believes to be the most
judicially sound analysis of Yniguez's claim.49
Judge Brunetti observed that "[t]he manifest function of the First
Amendment in a representative government requires that legislators
be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of pol-
icy,"'50 and that Article XXVIII precludes legislators from "fully ex-
pressing their views to, and learning the views of, [their]
constituents."'"
Judge Brunetti also noted that the majority opinion regarding the
public's interest in receiving services in Spanish could conflict with
existing Ninth Circuit precedent regarding the public's right to receive
such services.5" Judge Brunetti attempted to distinguish Yniguez from
these precedents, stating that "consideration of the public's interest in
receiving Yniguez's Spanish language communications is only for the
purpose of establishing her right to speak, not of establishing the pub-
lic's right to receive."53
In conclusion, the Brunetti concurrence adopted the majority
conclusion that Article XXVIII implicated pure speech of public con-
cern content. While concurring that Article XXVIII was facially over-
broad as applied to Yniguez, Brunetti also argued the provision was
sufficiently overbroad as applied only to elected officials.
46. See id. at 947.
47. See id. at 950 (Brunetti, J. concurring).
48. See id. at 951.
49. See infra Part IV.
50. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 951 (quoting Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135-36 (1966)).
51. Id. at 951.
52. See id.; see infra note 91 (recognizing Ninth Circuit case law denying constitutional
right to receive information in Spanish).
53. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 952.
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C. The Fernandez Dissent
The dissent of Judge Fernandez, joined by Chief Judge Wallace
and Judges Hall and Kleinfeld, disagreed with the majority's classifica-
tion of the speech interest involved. Rather than focusing on the
speech itself and making a threshold inquiry into whether speaking
Spanish implicated pure speech or expressive conduct, as the majority
did, the Fernandez dissent focused on the speaker, beginning its analy-
sis from the starting point that Yniguez's speech interest implicated
public employee speech rights.
Admitting this case presented neither a purely public nor private
concern issue, the Fernandez dissent nevertheless concluded that the
case was "more like a case of private concern speech."54 Focusing on
the language used, rather than the public or private concern content
of that language, the Fernandez dissent interpreted Article XXVIII as
a content-based restriction on the mode of expression, as opposed to
the majority's pure speech analysis.5 5 Citing recent Supreme Court
decisions, 56 Judge Fernandez concluded that a "State can, in general,
control the content and mode of its own speech, and the general pub-
lic does not have a constitutional right to have the State provide serv-
ices in any particular language.
'5 7
In sum, the Fernandez dissent analyzed Article XXVIII under the
public employee speech doctrine as a content-based restriction on pri-
vate concern speech. Applying rational basis review, the Fernandez
dissent concluded Article XXVIII did not violate the First
Amendment.58
D. The Wallace Dissent
Chief Judge Wallace concurred with the conclusions in the Fer-
nandez dissent. However, Wallace wrote separately to address the
majority's pure speech classification of Yniguez's speech interest.
Wallace opined that "[i]t is untenable for the majority to hold
that the Article restricts pure speech yet fail to identify [any] sup-
pressed messages," 59 articulating "the undeniable conclusion that the
Article regulates the mode of speech, not pure speech."60 Judge Wal-
54. Id. at 956 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 957.
56. See id. at 957-58 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2518-19 (1995); R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
57. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 958.
58. See id. at 959.
59. Ie (Wallace, CJ., dissenting).
60. Id.
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lace concluded that this classification "should end the matter, for mere
regulation of government employees' mode of speech does not impli-
cate the First Amendment or require the various balancing tests which
the majority employs.
'61
Thus, while concurring in the conclusion of the Fernandez dis-
sent, Wallace argued Article XXVIII implicated the mode of expres-
sion of public employee speech, rather than its content. As such,
Wallace concluded Arizona was free to regulate Yniguez's speech
under the First Amendment.
E. The Kozinski Dissent
Judge Kozinski, with whom Judge Kleinfeld joined, opined that
utterances made by government employees in the course of employ-
ment implicate speech rights held by the government, not employ-
ees.62 Judge Kozinski asserted that "Yniguez's case has nothing in
common with Pickering because the speech here belongs to the gov-
ernment; there is nothing to balance."6 3 Citing two recent Supreme
Court decisions, 64 Judge Kozinski concluded that the State may "regu-
late the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message. ' 65 Judge
Kozinski ended by noting that his decision was not necessarily disposi-
tive of Article XXVIII's constitutionality, as successful challenges may
exist under the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,66 or in First Amendment claims by those whose ability to
deal with the government is impaired.67
In short, Kozinski concluded that Article XXVIII regulated
speech rights held by the government, not employees. Relying on
Rust and Rosenberger, Kozinski concluded that Arizona was free to
regulate the content of its own messages under the First Amendment.
61. Id. at 960; see supra note 44 (describing the three tests).
62. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 961 (concluding that the "speech is the government's, not
theirs").
63. Id. at 962.
64. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding provision which prohibited
employees in federally-funded medical clinics from counseling about abortion); Rosenber-
ger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (holding that a state cannot deny
funding to student publication based on content because speech at issue was not
government's).
65. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 963.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1995).
67. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 963.
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H. Classification of Speech Interest at Issue in Language
Rights Cases
The first inquiry a court must make when evaluating First
Amendment challenges of speech restrictions is to determine what
type of speech is involved. Since different constitutional standards ap-
ply to different types of speech, this initial classification of the speech
interest is pivotal to the outcome of a case.
The opinions in Yniguez considered over seven different classifi-
cations of the speech interest regulated by Article XXVIII.68 Re-
markably, the majority failed to apply even one. Notwithstanding
extensive examination of numerous First Amendment cases, the ma-
jority failed to clearly identify which category of speech English-only
provisions fall under, leaving confusion and guesswork for judges as
well as legislators hoping to avoid the pitfalls suffered by Article
XXVIII.
A. Initial Classification of Language Rights as Speech or Conduct
Before addressing the specific facts of Yniguez's claim or the ex-
plicit language of Article XXVHI, the majority made the general de-
termination that restrictions on non-English communications involved
speech, not conduct.69 This Comment argues that the majority erred
in structuring its analysis in such a manner, as the "speech/conduct"
distinction is indeterminate and unavailing in the language rights con-
text, and leads to conclusory results of little analytical or precedential
value.
1. The Majority's Conclusion that Article XXVIII Implicated Pure
Speech
Arizonans for Official English asserted that "choice of lan-
guage.., is a mode of conduct"-a "nonverbal expressive activity
'70
similar to that engaged by plaintiffs in other "symbolic speech" cases.
In support of this view, Chief Judge Wallace concluded in his dissent
that the Article XXVIII regulates mode of expression and held that
68. See supra Part I. The majority opinion considered pure speech, symbolic speech,
expressive conduct, the right to receive information, and both private and public concern
content of government employee speech. In addition, the Fernandez dissent considered
Article XXVIII as both a manner- and content-based restriction on public employee
speech. The Wallace dissent classified Article XXVIII as a restriction on mode of expres-
sion. The Kozinski dissent classified the speech interest as the government's, not
Yniguez's.
69. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 936.
70. Ld. at 934.
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any conclusion that it regulates pure speech is simply untenable.7 '
The majority concluded, however, that categorizing and analyzing
Yniguez's speech as a mode of expression is erroneous.
The majority concedes that "a bilingual person does, of course,
make an expressive choice by choosing to speak one language rather
than another." 72 But, the majority found the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Texas v. Johnson disposed of any such reasoning.73 In Johnson,
the Court held that "[i]n deciding whether particular conduct pos-
sesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amend-
ment into play, we have asked whether '[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it." 74 In this case, it is clear that Yniguez did not intend to convey
any message by merely choosing to speak in Spanish. This conduct in
no way symbolized or expressed any substantive communication she
hoped to convey.75
Therefore, the majority logically turned to Cohen v. California,
which "emphatically reject[ed] the suggestion that the decision to
speak in a language other than English does not implicate pure speech
concerns, but is instead akin to expressive conduct. '76 In Cohen, the
Supreme Court recognized the First Amendment status of choice of
language when it reversed the conviction of a man who walked
through a courthouse corridor wearing a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the Draft. ' 77  California argued, much like Arizonans for Offi-
cial English does here, that Cohen's choice of profane language was
conduct similar to "symbolic speech. ' 78 The Court in Cohen held that
"[t]he only 'conduct' which the State sought to punish is the fact of
communication. '79 The Court, therefore, concluded that the "convic-
tion rest[ed] solely upon speech,... not upon any separately identifi-
71. See id. at 959 (Wallace, CJ., dissenting).
72. Id. at 935 (footnote omitted).
73. See 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
74. Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-411 (1974)).
75. See id. at 397 (burning an American flag to symbolically convey a message of pro-
test); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing an
arm band to symbolically convey a message of protest); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968) (burning a draft card to symbolically communicate protest of war); Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (communicating protest of segregation through a
sit-in).
76. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 1996).
77. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding California's "offensive con-
duct" provision unconstitutional).
78. Id. at 18.
79. Id.
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able conduct which allegedly was intended by Cohen to be perceived
by others as expressive of particular views."" ° As Yniguez's use of a
non-English language was not intended to be "perceived by others as
expressive of particular views," the majority rejected Chief Judge Wal-
lace's dissenting analysis on this point.
2. Artificiality of Speech/Conduct Distinction
The major flaw in the structure of analysis adopted by the major-
ity and the dissent is that both seek to identify a speech/conduct dis-
tinction that is indeterminate and inevitably false, leading to
conclusory results that fail to provide any insight or guidance for ana-
lyzing future language rights issues.81 Frequently, courts struggle to
classify First Amendment issues as either speech or conduct. The
problem with making such a distinction is that it has less determinate
value than assumed. All communication, be it verbal, written or
otherwise, contains some element of conduct-so too, is most conduct
expressive.8 As one commentator has noted:
To some extent expression and action are always mingled; most
conduct includes elements of both. Even the clearest manifesta-
tions of expression involve some action, as in the case of holding
a meeting, publishing a newspaper, or merely talking. At the
other extreme, a political assassination includes a substantial
mixture of expression.
83
A speaker's decision to use certain words, tone of voice, wording,
body language, and mannerisms all contain elements of both speech
and conduct. As Tribe illustrated, "[e]xpression and conduct, message
and medium, are thus inextricably tied together in all communicative
behavior; expressive behavior is '100% action and 100% expres-
sion. ' '8 4 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court has
80. Id.; cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
81. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AmERicAN CONSTTUTONAL LAW § 12-7, at 827 (2d ed.
1988).
82. See, eg., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning an American flag); Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (contributing money to political campaign); Spence v. Wash-
ington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (displaying flag with peace symbol attached); Cohen, 403 U.S.
15 (wearing a jacket with "Fuck the draft" written on the back); Schact v. United States,
398 U.S. 58 (1970) (wearing a uniform); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing an arm band); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963) (conducting a sit-in demonstration); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (litigat-
ing as a form of political expression); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (requiring a compulsory flag salute); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940) (picketing); Stromberg, 283 U.S. 359 (displaying red flag).
83. See THOMAS IRWIN EMERsON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssION, 84
(1970).
84. TRIBE, supra note 81, § 12-7, at 827 (citations omitted).
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failed to articulate any rational basis for making such a distinction.
Any attempt to shoehorn speech and conduct into distinct categories
would prove unworkable, as any communicative effort could "be hung
almost randomly on the 'speech' peg or the 'conduct' peg as one sees
fit. "85
The artificiality of the speech/conduct distinction induces courts
to advocate exclusively those facts which will justify whatever conclu-
sion is most convenient to the ultimate holding.8 6 For this reason,
some scholars have concluded that "[a]ttempts to determine which el-
ement 'predominates' will therefore inevitably degenerate into ques-
tion-begging judgments about whether the activity should be
protected."'' Yniguez illustrates this paradox perfectly.
The majority initially focuses on the communicative nature of lan-
guage and the use of language to convey meaning. or a message, rea-
soning that "[1]anguage, words, wording, tone of voice-are not
expressive conduct, but are simply among the communicative ele-
ments of speech."88 The court acknowledges that "vibrating one's vo-
cal chords, moving one's mouth and thereby making sounds, or...
putting pen to paper, or hand to keyboard" is clearly expressive con-
duct, but dismisses it with the tautological rationale that such conduct
is shaped by language, and language by definition is speech.8 9 The
fact that the majority must go to such irrational lengths only proves
the indeterminability of speech/conduct distinctions. Any attempt to
distinguish that which cannot be distinguished inevitably leads to such
inarticulable justifications as demonstrated above. Such conclusions,
being so easily and frequently manipulable, provide no precedential
guidance to attorneys, legislators or the judiciary.
The majority also relies to some degree on the public's "right to
receive information and ideas" 90 to justify a pure speech categoriza-
tion. Unfortunately, in so doing, the majority opinion "confuses its
evaluation of the interests favoring First Amendment protection," 91
85. Id.
86. See Stephanie M. Kaufman, The Speech/Conduct Distinction and First Amendment
Protection of Begging in Subways, 79 Gao. L.J. 1803, 1821 (1991).
87. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. PRnv. 1482, 1495 (1975).
88. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 1996).
89. Id. at 934.
90. Id. Arizonans for Official English had alleged that "the state may not be com-
pelled to provide information to all members of the public in a language they can compre-
hend." Id.
91. Il at 960 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting). Judge Brunetti's concurrence even took great
pains to clarify the majority's analysis, emphasizing "consideration of the public's interest
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muddling the public's alleged interest "in the unique content and
meaning which Yniguez can only convey in... Spanish"'  and the
public preference that "Yniguez speak in a mode they can under-
stand."93 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has long recognized that "indi-
vidual citizens have no constitutional right to require that state
services be performed in any particular language.
'94
Finally, the majority attempts to support its conclusion by reason-
ing that choice of language may "simply be based on a pragmatic de-
sire to convey information. '95 The majority even cites Cohen for
support, a case that arguably had more difficulty with the speech/con-
duct dichotomy than Yniguez.96
In an approach similar to that taken by the majority, the Wallace
dissent willfully molds the facts to support its expressive conduct cate-
gorization. The Wallace dissent claims that the majority's difficulty in
identifying the content of the speech that Article XXVIII suppresses
is indicative that the true speech interest at issue is mode of expres-
sion, not pure speech.97 Wallace concludes that because the majority
cannot clearly identify the "meaning conveyed" by Yniguez's speak-
ing in Spanish, rather than English, it confuses its evaluation of the
speech interest.98 This reasoning erroneously assumes that speech/
conduct categories are mutually exclusive; that is, since the majority's
justification for classifying the interest involved as pure speech was
erroneous, the speech interest is ipso facto conduct. The dissent strug-
gles in its attempt to categorize language rights for the same reason as
the majority. The classification is illusory. The manipulability of the
speech/conduct distinction and its indeterminate content render any
in receiving Yniguez's Spanish language communication is only for the purpose of estab-
lishing her right to speak, not of establishing the public's right to receive." Id. at 952.
92. I& at 960.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 958 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (citing Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Ele-
mentary Sch. Dist., 587 F.2d 1022, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1978); Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d
738, 739 (9th Cir. 1973)). Despite this precedent, the majority considered the public's in-
terest in receiving information to be an important element of its analysis. The majority
argued that the Supreme Court decision in National Treasury Employees Union "makes it
clear that public employee speech doctrine ... afford[s] First Amendment protection to
speech that the public has an interest in receiving." Id. at 942 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 149 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968)); see also
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1015 (1995).
95. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 935.
96. Justice Blackmun's dissent characterized Cohen's claim as "mainly conduct and
little speech," Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J. dissenting), while
the majority stated Cohen's conviction rested "solely on speech," id. at 18.
97. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 959.
98. See id. at 960.
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such distinction by the Yniguez court erroneous and misleading.
Therefore, any determination that Yniguez's Spanish communications
are pure speech or expressive conduct "must be seen at best as an-
nouncing a conclusion of the Court, rather than as summarizing in any
way the analytic processes which led the Court to that conclusion." 99
Aside from its futility, the speech/conduct distinction is simply
unnecessary in this case. Article XXVIII is not aimed directly at ideas
or information, but rather seeks a goal independent of communicative
content by restricting the speech of government employees. 100 Rather
than focusing in the abstract on speech or conduct, the majority
should have begun its analysis by examining the facts of the case.
Yniguez challenged Article XXVIII as a public employee. Thus, this
Comment argues that any analysis of the speech interest at issue must
begin with the public employee speech doctrine.
B. The Majority's Application of the Public Employee Speech
Doctrine
After categorizing the speech interest as pure speech, the major-
ity then turned its analysis to the public employee speech doctrine,
focusing on whether Yniguez's speech was a matter of public or pri-
vate concern. Relying on Pickering and Waters, the majority con-
cluded that the content of Yniguez's speech involved matters of public
concern.' 0 ' This conclusion was in error. The majority misapplied
precedent by forcing Yniguez's speech into the public versus private
concern dichotomy when it clearly did not fall within the traditional
definitions.
99. TRIBE, supra note 81, § 12-7, at 827.
100. See TRIBE, supra note 81, § 12-23, at 977-80. Tribe argues that any First Amend-
ment analysis should focus on the government, as historically posited by traditional speech
cases. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Tribe analyzes free speech issues
with a two-tier approach. If the regulation is aimed at the "communicative impact" or
substance of an act, then analysis follows under the first tier, where the government bears
the burden of showing restricted speech poses a "clear and present danger" or otherwise
falls within that class of nonprotected speech. TRIBE, supra, § 12-2, at 791. Government
acts, like Article XXVIII, though not aimed at ideas or information per se, seek a goal
independent of communicative content or impact and have the indirect result of constrict-
ing the flow of information or ideas. Evaluation of these types of acts follows under the
second tier. Id. § 12-23, at 977. On this tier, free speech values and the government's
regulatory interest are balanced, and a regulation will be upheld so long as it does not
unduly restrict the flow of information and ideas. Id. § 12-2, at 792.
101. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 939 n.23 (conceding "the speech cannot be easily pigeon-
holed," the majority concluded "the speech prohibited by Article XXVIII... more closely
resembles public concern than private concern speech"); see infra notes 128-34 and accom-
panying text.
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1. The Majority's Conclusion
Historically, the Supreme Court has held that public employee
speech could be restricted by terms of employment. The Court in Wa-
ters held that "even many of the most fundamental maxims of our
First Amendment jurisprudence cannot reasonably be applied to
speech by government employees."' 02 As Justice Holmes stated, "[a
police officer] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman."' 1 3 In 1968, however,
the Court began to recognize that public employees could no longer
be "subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable."'0
The Supreme Court has examined the public employee speech doc-
trine in several decisions, of which the majority focused on Pickering,
Connick, Waters, Rutan and National Treasury Employees Union.
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court examined
the constitutionality of a decision by the Illinois Board of Education
to dismiss a teacher for writing and publishing a letter critical of the
Board's allocation of school funds.10 5 The Supreme Court stated that
how a school system raises and spends revenue is the type of issue
about which "free and open debate is vital to informed decision-mak-
ing by the electorate." 0 6 Thus, "it is essential that [public employees]
be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retalia-
tory dismissal.' 0 7 In reversing the dismissal, the Supreme Court es-
tablished a balancing test to be applied to First Amendment
challenges by government employees regarding restrictions on their
freedom to speak out on matters of public concern: 08 "The prob-
lem ... is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [em-
ployee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the effi-
ciency of the public services it performs through its employees." 0 9
102. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878,1886 (1994). As one commentator noted, "the
public employee speech doctrine has long recognized the uneasy, yet necessary trade-off
between the free and lively exchange of ideas and the efficient and proper functioning of
our public institutions." Terence Cawley, 'Great Subtleties of Judgment': The Fourth Cir-
cuit's Approach to the Public Employee Speech Doctrine in Jackson v. Bair, 67 N.C. L. REv.
976, 976 (1989).
103. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.W. 517, 517-18 (1892).
104. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
105. 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
106. Id. at 571-72.
107. Id. at 572.
108. See id. at 569.
109. Id. at 566.
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In Connick v. Myers the Court announced a standard for assess-
ing the Pickering public concern content prong. 110 In Connick, an em-
ployee of the district attorney was terminated for circulating a
questionnaire soliciting the views of her fellow workers regarding of-
fice transfer policy, morale, and general office administration."' The
Court upheld the termination because the limited First Amendment
interest involved did not require the district attorney to tolerate dis-
ruptive office behavior."' The Court stated, "[w]hether an em-
ployee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record.""' The Supreme Court has applied the
test "only when the employee spoke 'as a citizen upon matters of pub-
lic concern' rather than 'as an employee upon matters only of personal
interest.""1 4 The Court has generally "refrained from intervening in
government employer decisions that are based on speech that is of
entirely private concern.""' 5 Thus, any application of what the major-
ity refers to as the "Waters/Pickering" standard requires a preliminary
determination of content.
Judge Kozinski's dissent, however, argues that by limiting its anal-
ysis to the Waters/Pickering line of inquiry, the majority ignores two
more recent approaches to the public employee speech doctrine."
6
Kozinski argues that "[t]he majority masks the enormity of its depar-
ture [from precedent] by pretending this is just another employee-
speech case like Pickering... or Waters""' 7 and fails to recognize the
speech at issue here is the government's speech, not Yniguez's. In this
respect, Judge Kozinski correctly addresses the very distinction the
majority missed, concluding that Yniguez is merely speaking words
for the government when she performs her official duties, and thus has
no personal stake in those words."" Unfortunately, Kozinski's next
110. 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
111. See iL at 141.
112. See id at 147-48.
113. Id
114. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1013 (1995)
(quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147).
115. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994).
116. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 963 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski concluded that the majority ignored the Supreme
Court's language and common sense by dismissing these cases as "dealing with entirely
different circumstances." Id. Kozinski further concluded that "[s]ince government 'is the
speaker' only through its employees, [the standards of law in] Rust and Rosenberger clearly
encompass Yniguez's situation." Id.
117. Id. at 962.
118. See id
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step is in error, as he considers two recent Supreme Court cases that,
because of their content-based standards, are distinguishable from
Yniguez.
119
In Rust v. Sullivan, private employees in federally funded medical
clinics asserted that a federal provision which prohibited them from
counseling about abortion violated their First Amendment rights.12 0
The Supreme Court held the provision did not offend the First
Amendment because "[t]he employees remain free . . . to pursue
abortion-related activities when they are.., acting as private individu-
als."' 21 In Rosenberger v. Rector and the University of Virginia, a stu-
dent newspaper alleged that denial of university funding on grounds
the publication "promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about
a deity or ultimate reality" in violation of the university's student ac-
tivities fund guidelines violated the First Amendment. 22 The
Supreme Court recognized that "[w]hen the government disburses
public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it
may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is
neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee,' 23 but concluded that
the denial of funds was unconstitutional in this case because the
speech at issue was the private speech of students, and not govern-
ment speech. 24
Judge Kozinski argues that Yniguez, like Rust, is free to "speak
out against Article XXVIII on her own time" as a private individ-
ual.'2 His observation is irrelevant to this case. Yniguez, unlike Rust
or Rosenberger, does not disagree with the government's position on
an issue. She does not wish to convey her own opinions on a subject
matter while on the job. As even Kozinski notes, she merely wishes to
convey the government's message in a different language. Unlike
Yniguez, the speech interest in both Rust and Rosenberger involved
employees expressing opinions on substantive issues highly debated in
the public arena.'26 Yniguez was not conveying any opinion or view
in the spirit of Rust and Rosenberger by merely speaking Spanish.
119. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a university's exclusion-
ary policy prohibiting use of grounds for religious worship and teaching violates principle
that state regulation should be content-neutral).
120. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-81 (1991).
121. Id. at 198-99.
122. Rosenberger v. Rector and the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2513 (1995).
123. Id. at 2519 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-200).
124. Id. at 2524-25.
125. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 962 (9th Cir. 1996).
126. See Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (counseling about abortion provided by employees); Rosen-
berger, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (publishing student newspaper on religious views).
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Simply put, the content of her message is not at issue. Moreover, Rust
and Rosenberger are limited to regulations involving "government
subsidization of speech by private parties," which is not the case
here.127 Thus, these are simply irrelevant to Yniguez's speech interest.
2. The Majority's Erroneous Analysis Under the Public Versus Private
Concern Content Distinction
Despite conceding "the speech [here] does not fit easily into any
of the categories previously established in the case law,' 128 the major-
ity nevertheless felt compelled to pigeonhole the speech into a Picker-
ing category. 29  The result of this erroneous application of the
Waters/Pickering standard is an obfuscated, nebulous categorization of
Yniguez's speech interest that has little precedential value. Moreover,
the convoluted inquiry could have easily been avoided by merely fo-
cusing on the public concern content of elected officials' speech.
The majority's classification of the speech interest is murky, ow-
ing in part to tensions between the adopted language of the three-
judge panel decision and the footnotes added by the majority. After
concluding the speech is not of private concern, the adopted language
recognizes that the speech interest cannot precisely be classified as
public concern because Yniguez is not commenting on a public issue
and, more to the point, Yniguez is actually performing her official du-
ties in speaking.' 30 This language seems to imply that as Yniguez's
comments are "addressed to a public audience, [are] made outside the
workplace, and do involve[ ] content largely unrelated to [her] govern-
ment employment,''113 they must fall outside the definition of public
concern speech. The majority, on the other hand, concludes in foot-
127. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 940 n.24. "Neither Rosenberger nor Rust concerned the author-
ity of the state to penalize the speech of its public employees, let alone to adopt a general
prohibitory rule of sweeping applicability regarding such speech." Id.
128. Id. at 939. See Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1878 (1994); Rutan v. Republi-
can Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729; Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
129. The Fernandez dissent falls into the same trap. Fernandez begins its analysis by
opining "the issue involves the language used, not the public or private concern content of
the language.... The language does not, in the sense used here, change the content at all."
Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 955-56. Notwithstanding this logical interpretation of Yniguez's speech
interest, the dissent still feels compelled to pigeonhole the speech into a Pickering cate-
gory. Despite admitting this "is not a public concern speaking-out case... [nor] ... exactly
a private concern case" the Fernandez dissent concludes the interest here "is more like a
case of private concern speech." Id. at 956. The Fernandez dissent reasons that because
"Yniguez, for her own private reasons, does not wish to obey [the state] determination"
that its work be done in English, the speech interest necessarily falls under private concern.
Id
130. See id. at 956.
131. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1013 (1995).
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note 23 that "the speech prohibited by Article XXVIII . . . more
closely resembles public concern than private concern speech,"' 2 cit-
ing as support for its conclusions the reasons previously discussed in
the adopted language. However, the adopted language subsequently
concludes:
That the fact that the speech occurs as a part of the performance
of the employee's job functions affects the nature of our analysis
but does not necessarily determine its outcome. The context in
which the speech occurs must be weighed along with the other
relevant factors when we balance the conflicting interests .... 133
Thus, despite claiming the speech interest was neither public nor pri-
vate, the adopted language implicitly applied the Pickering balancing
test, thereby evaluating the speech interest as public concern
speech.
134
To force the speech interest of Yniguez into a public or private
concern classification "ignores the cases which define 'matter of public
concern,"' because those cases focus on the content of public employ-
ees' speech to see whether it contributes to public debate.
135
Yniguez's speech is distinguishable from the speech interests at issue
in traditional public employee speech cases.
Unlike the defendants in Pickering, Connick, and Waters,
Yniguez did not criticize the policies or decisions of the state, either
within the workplace or without. Nor was Yniguez exercising her
right as a citizen to speak outside the workplace on matters of public
interest, as in National Treasury Employees Union. Rather, Yniguez
communicated government information at the workplace in a foreign
language. Her speech was not disruptive to other employees. Simply
put, Yniguez did not speak out as a citizen on matters of public con-
cern, nor did she speak as an employee upon matters only of personal
interest.13 6 Rather, she performed her official duties in a manner the
state found offensive.
In addition, unlike the provisions evaluated in these traditional
cases, Article XXVIII is content-neutral. Article XXVIII does not
chill Yniguez from expressing any view or opinion on a given subject;
132. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 939 n.23.
133. Id. at 940.
134. The majority fails to state clearly whether the Pickering test applies here (though it
cites it in the preceding sentence), or that the National Treasury Employees Union ap-
proach applies. See infra Part HI. This failure no doubt derives from the majority's inabil-
ity to clearly classify the speech interest at issue.
135. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 960.
136. Cf Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983).
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rather, it merely regulates the means of communication she may em-
ploy in performing her official duties. 37
In conclusion, by erroneously focusing on the speech/conduct di-
chotomy as well as misapplying precedent under the public employee
speech doctrine, the majority's classification of Yniguez's speech as
pure speech of public concern failed to accurately define the speech
interest at issue. Moreover, this line of analysis was unnecessary, as
the speech interest of elected officials provided sufficient basis to de-
termine the constitutionality of Article XXVIII.
II. Determination of the Applicable Constitutional Standard
of Review
Having erroneously classified the speech interest, the majority,
not surprisingly, subsequently struggled to find the correct standard of
review. In typical First Amendment challenges, determining the ap-
plicable standard of review is relatively simple once the type of speech
interest is identified. In Yniguez, however, the majority's broad iden-
tification of the speech interest was so amorphous and internally in-
consistent .that it was subsequently faced with three different
standards that could arguably apply. Consequently, the majority
failed to determine which of the three divergent constitutional ap-
proaches applied.
A. Constitutional Standards Considered
In evaluating the various standards, the majority focused on the
justifications of the state's interest in restricting Yniguez's choice of
language. The first interest considered was the state's interest in effi-
ciency and effectiveness.138  Because the majority considered the
speech to be more like public concern, the first step in its analysis
required "a weighing and balancing process similar to that conducted
in the more traditional [public concern] cases,' 39 thereby implicating
137. The government clearly has some interest in regulating the substance of ideas and
information that reflect official State position on various issues. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S.
Ct. 1878, 1886 (1994) (noting that government might prohibit employees "from being 'rude
to customers"') (citations omitted); see also Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 939-40. The Supreme
Court has "never expressed doubt that a government employer may bar its employees
from using Mr. Cohen's offensive utterance to members of the public." Waters, 114 S. Ct.
at 1886. The mere fact that it is necessary for employees or representatives to communi-
cate those views to the public does not diminish this interest. Article XXVIII, however, is
wholly unconcerned with the content of the information Yniguez communicates to the
public.
138. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 938-39 (quoting Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1088).
139. Id at 942.
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the Waters/Pickering standard. Under Waters/Pickering, the Court ap-
plied a "less stringent scrutiny [than] is ordinarily justified in review-
ing restrictions on public employee speech."'140 The government's
concern with efficiency and effectiveness must be balanced against the
public employee's First Amendment interest in speaking.
Applying this approach to Yniguez, the majority concluded that
"the efficiency and effectiveness considerations that constitute the
fundamental governmental interest ... are wholly absent."'1 41 The
majority opined that Yniguez's use of Spanish increased state effi-
ciency and effectiveness, recognizing, however, that "public employ-
ees have no right to speak in another language when to do so would
hinder job performance." 42 The majority concluded that since the
Waters/Pickering standard was limited to considerations of efficiency
and effectiveness, and since the speech interest in this case did not
"adversely affect the state's interest in efficiency and effectiveness,"
Arizonans for Official English would therefore lose by default were
the court to apply this standard. 43
The second state interest the majority examined involved
"broader concerns that the government might have in the structure
and functioning of society as a whole,"'4 a line of inquiry usually
reserved for cases involving patronage practices.' 45 These broad soci-
etal interests were analyzed in light of two different standards: the
balancing test of National Treasury Employees Union, and the strict
scrutiny test established in Rutan.
National Treasury Employees Union, decided five years after
Rutan, remarkably did not even mention Rutan or refer to any specific
level of scrutiny.' 46 As the Yniguez majority noted, the Rutan Court
decided not to "[fix] on superficially precise legal labels or formulae
that are easily manipulated by sophisticated lawyers and judges," but
rather chose to conduct "a thorough and judicious examination of the
practical impact of the legislation... and its effect on constitutionally
protected interests." 47 Applying such reasoning to this case, the ma-
140. Id. at 938.
141. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 942.
142. Id. at 943.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 70 n.4 (1990)).
145. See Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2735-37 (finding interests in preventing excessive political
fragmentation and strengthening the party system); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973) (finding an interest in preventing development of powerful and
corrupt political machine).
146. See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
147. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 944.
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jority concluded "[t]here is no basis in the record to support the pro-
ponents' assertion that [unity and political stability, a common
language, or public confidence] ... are served by the provisions of
Article XXVIII,"'1 48 opining that Arizonans for Official English offers
nothing more than assertion and conjecture to support its claim.
In Rutan, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard to restric-
tions on public employees' political activities. The Yniguez majority
concluded that "there was no reason to relax the strict scrutiny ordina-
rily applied to restrictions on speech" because the government's inter-
est in Yniguez's speech was not "employment-related. '149 As the
asserted state interests were held unconstitutional under the relaxed
balancing test of National Treasury Employees Union, the majority
concluded "[a] fortiori, that the article could never survive a tradi-
tional strict scrutiny test [like Rutan]." 50
B. Determination of Applicable Standard
After evaluating the facts under the three alternative constitu-
tional approaches, the majority balked when it came time to decide
which applied in this case. Unbelievably, the majority concluded it
"need not decide what level of scrutiny or what approach to balancing
is applicable"' 5' because Article XXVIII patently fails all three:
Whether we apply strict scrutiny as suggested by Rutan, whether
we use a form of balancing test similar to that advocated by the
Rutan dissenters and modelled on the... Waters/Pickering line
of cases, or whether we follow the course chosen by the Court in
National Treasury Employees Union, the result is the same: The
restrictions on free speech are not justified by the alleged state
interests.' 2
The inability of the majority to identify what standard of law applies
probably stems from its failure to clearly identify what type of speech
interest is involved.
This failure is in sharp contrast to the dissenting opinions. The
Fernandez dissent classified the speech interest as private concern
content of public employee speech, and subsequently applied Connick
to conclude that Article XXVIII is constitutional.153 The Fernandez
dissent argued in the alternative that even if the speech interest were
148. Id. at 944-45.
149. Id. at 944 (citing Rutan, 497 U.S. at 70 n.4).
150. Id. at 947.
151. Id. at 944.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 956.
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identified as having public concern content, as the majority seems to
imply at one point, the Rosenberger standard would apply, mandating
the same constitutional determination. 154 The Kozinski dissent identi-
fies the interest as government speech, not Yniguez's, and also calls
for the application of the "Rust/Rosenberger" standard of review. 55
Chief Judge Wallace's dissent concluded that Article XXVIII reg-
ulated the mode of speech, rather than pure speech. 56 Accordingly,
Wallace asserted that such a "conclusion should end the matter, for
mere regulation of government employees' mode of speech does not
implicate the First Amendment or require the various balancing tests
which the majority employs." 57
C. Absence of Precedential Value
The majority's conclusion renders the decision of little value to
legislators or future courts faced with deciding on the constitutionality
of less restrictive English-only provisions. The speech interest in-
volved in Yniguez is sufficiently narrow to warrant more definite
guidelines, as undoubtedly such issues exist in other states.'58 While it
may be true that the facts in this case were so egregious that Article
XXVIII patently failed all three standards posited, what will happen
in the next case? The standards considered range anywhere from
strict scrutiny 5 9 to a simple balancing test without any identifiable
level of scrutiny.160 If the legal system is founded on the Constitution
and precedents that properly apply it, what guidance exists for the
legislator or district court judge regarding a provision that falls some-
where in between these standards?
In conclusion, despite considering three possible constitutional
standards, the majority failed to state which standard applies to lan-
guage rights issues. This failure to identify the applicable standard, in
conjunction with the majority's erroneous determination of the speech
154. See id at 957.
155. See id. at 963.
156. See id. at 959-60.
157. Id.
158. The Tenth Circuit recently addressed an amendment to the Colorado Constitution
designating English as the State's official language. See Montero v. Meyer, 13 F.3d 1444
(10th Cir. 1994). However, review in Montero was limited to the constitutionality of the
procedure employed by the Secretary of State in submitting the initiative to the Colorado
ballot. As such, the court has yet to reach the substantive merit of the amendment.
159. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 70.
160. See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1015-18
(1995).
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interest at issue, results in a confusing decision which provides abso-
lutely no guidance for legislators, advocates or the judiciary.
IV. Alternative Resolutions
The majority's failure to author a case of any significant prece-
dential value could have been avoided. Prior First Amendment adju-
dication provides sufficient means to decide and analyze this case in
such a manner so as to have jurisprudential merit, regardless of
whether the court focused on the overbreadth of Article XXVIII as
applied to the speech interest of elected officials or whether the court
limited review to Yniguez's speech interest.
A. Elected Officials' Speech Interest
To be faithful to precedent and to provide a clear decision for
legislators and lower courts, the court should have limited its analysis
to the chilling effects Article XXVIII had on the speech of elected
officials. While Yniguez's speech may not fall within the public versus
private concern classification, that does not preclude other employee
speech from meeting this definition. Because Article XXVIII was
challenged as facially overbroad, the court must also consider whether
the provision threatens the protected speech of others not before the
court.161 Thus, inquiring into the regulation's effects on the speech
rights of third-party government officials within the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches of Arizona' 62 was clearly within the scope
of legitimate adjudication. Judge Brunetti recognized this interest by
focusing his opinion on Arizona's elected officials.
When addressing overbreadth challenges, the court must inquire
whether the challenged provision "sweeps within its ambit other activ-
ities that constitute an exercise" of protected speech or expression.
163
Article XXVIII applies to all branches of government and "all gov-
ernment officials and employees during the performance of govern-
ment business."" 4 Article XXVIII's restrictions clearly applied to the
161. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97. "An individual whose own speech or expressive conduct
may validly be prohibited or sanctioned is permitted to challenge a statute on its face be-
cause it also threatens others not before the court-those who desire to engage in legally
protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or
undertake to have the law declared partially invalid." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,
472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985).
162. See ARIz. CONST. art. XXVIII.
163. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97; see also discussion supra note 139.
164. See ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, §§ 3(a)(i), 3(a)(iv).
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speech of elected officials and thus any overbreadth challenge of the
provision required examination of elected officials' speech rights.
Unlike Yniguez's, the speech interest of elected officials repre-
sents a readily identifiable category of speech that fits easily within
traditional public employee speech doctrine. If matters of public con-
cern include expressions relating to any political, social or other con-
cern of the community, 165 then clearly communications between
elected officials and their constituents fall within this category. Since
the category of speech is readily identifiable, so too is the applicable
standard of review. In this case, the court need merely determine
whether Article XXVIII restrictions were "employment related"
under Rutan.1 66 If so, strict scrutiny must be employed; if not, the
balancing approach of Waters/Pickering controls.
Article XXVIII restricts candidates for re-election from discuss-
ing issues voters may consider critical in making informed ballot deci-
sions. In addition, the provision prevents elected officials from
properly representing their constituents by precluding representatives
from "expressing their views to, and learning the views of, those con-
stituents."'167 Communication between citizens and the electorate is at
the heart of representative democracy-without it, the concept of gov-
ernment by representation ceases to exist. Moreover, as Judge
Brunetti notes, ethnic and cultural diversity are "inextricably inter-
twined" with the democratic and political processes. 68 To restrict in-
put from culturally diverse groups is to impose political conformity:
Republican government should have "zeal for different opinions con-
cerning religion, concerning Government and many other points.'
'1 69
"The harm to society from such unconstitutional interference with the
democratic process"' 7 ° provides sufficient grounds in itself to strike
Article XXVIII as unconstitutional.'
7'
Article XXVIII is facially overbroad when analyzed in this man-
ner. Despite the fact that elected officials represent a small number of
government employees, when applied to elected officials, Article
XXVIII strikes at the very foundation of the democratic process. It
165. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
166. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62,70 n.4 (1990) (concluding that because
the government's interests were not "employee-related" there was no reason to relax strict
scrutiny traditionally applied to speech restrictions).
167. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 951 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Brunetti, J., concurring).
168. Id
169. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 44 (James Madison) (Garry Willis ed., 1982).
170. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 950.
171. See discussion infra Part M.
276 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:247
denies citizens the fundamental right to participate in the political
process. "[I]nformative inquiry and advocacy by elected officials"' 72
is essential to the effective operation of our political process. As the
Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he manifest function of the First
Amendment in a representative government requires that legislators
be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of pol-
icy." 173 The harm to society from such unconstitutional interference
with the democratic process is sufficient to find Article XXVIII un-
constitutionally overbroad.' 74
B. Yniguez's Speech Interest
Simply stated, traditional applications of the public employee
speech doctrine as seen in Pickering, Waters, Rutan, and Rosenberger
do not apply to Yniguez's speech interest. These applications of the
doctrine are all content-based, while Yniguez's choice to speak in a
non-English language is wholly independent of the content spoken.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions recognize this, but they fail
to take the next step and explore alternate means to resolve the
problem.
75
Though such inquiry is unnecessary, if the court felt compelled to
address the merits of Yniguez's speech it could have resolved the issue
consistently with the underlying rationale of the public employee
speech doctrine.
The goal of the public employee speech doctrine is to recognize
the government interest in regulating employee speech by limiting the
breadth of freedom such employees enjoy outside the workplace. The
government may have a wide berth when regulating employee speech,
such speech is still subject to First Amendment protection. Although
Yniguez's speech did not fit traditional public versus private concern
content of employee speech, her speech was still protected by the First
Amendment. Any resolution of Yniguez's claim must strike a balance
between Arizona's interest in regulating its employees and Yniguez's
First Amendment right to free speech. Therefore, the court should
have addressed Yniguez's speech rights along one of two possible
lines: (1) by applying the "time, place and manner" test established in
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence;176 or (2) by explicitly
172. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 951 (Brunetti, J., concurring).
173. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135-36 (1966).
174. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 951 (Brunetti, J., concurring).
175. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
176. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
Fall 1996] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ENGLISH-ONLY PROVISIONS 277
recognizing the two-tier analysis adopted by traditional speech cases
as posited by Tribe.
177
Article XXVIII clearly regulates public employee speech, and
there can be little doubt that Ynguez, as a public employee, "does not
have a full panoply of freedoms to do what she likes when she is per-
forming her job."'17 But it is equally clear that Yniguez's speech in-
terest does not fit within the traditional public versus private concern
distinction of Waters/Pickering. Public employee cases are rooted in
the rights of employees to participate in public affairs. The Pickering
test applies to subjects upon which free and open debate are vital to
informed decision-making by the populace, and "comes into play only
when a public employee's speech implicates the government's inter-
ests as an employer."'179 The public versus private concern distinction
is "relevant to the constitutional inquiry only when the [subjects]-by
virtue of their content or the context in which they were made-may
have an adverse impact on the government's ability to perform." 80
The subject of Yniguez's speech did not address any matter relevant
to public debate. The content of her communications changed every
time she spoke because in each instance it was addressed to the ques-
tions and concerns of the citizen seeking her assistance in processing
medical claims. Her speech did not seek to convey any opinion nor to
inform the public of any matter vital to the free and open debate of an
informed electorate. The provision, in short, restricted the manner of
her expression.
The government generally has authority to regulate the manner
of speech used by employees when performing their official duties.
The Court in Connick recognized that "[w]hen employee expression
cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, so-
cial, or other concern to the community, government officials should
enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive over-
sight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.'' That
does not mean that Yniguez's speech, "even if not touching upon a
matter of public concern, is totally beyond the protection of the First
Amendment." 82 Any type of expression, whether it is oral, written
or symbolized by conduct, "is subject to reasonable time, place, or
177. See TRmE, supra notes 81, § 12-7, at 100.
178. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 955 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
179. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. I& at 157.
181. Id. at 146.
182. Id. at 147.
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manner restrictions."'8 3 Under the time, place or manner test, "re-
strictions are valid provided that they are justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information."'8
4
In this case, Article XXVIII fails the narrowly tailored prong.
To be narrowly tailored, a regulation must promote "a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation."' 85 In the present case, the state interest in efficiency and
effectiveness is wholly absent. Common sense illustrates that an office
performs more effectively and efficiently when it is able to provide
services in a language customers can understand. The parties even
conceded that Article XXVIII runs counter to the effectiveness of its
employees." 6 As the majority noted, "if the purpose of Article
XXVIH were to promote efficiency, it would not impose a total ban
but would provide that languages other than English may be
used... only when they facilitate such business and not when they
hinder it."'18 7 As for the broader societal interests asserted by the
state,18 8 no basis exists to support the assertion that unity and political
stability, a common language, or public confidence are served by Arti-
cle XXVIII.8 9 In short, "there is no substantial nexus between the
alleged governmental interest[s] and job performance." 90 The state
"may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial por-
tion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals."19'
Therefore, failing the narrowly tailored prong of Clark is sufficient to
find Article XXVIII facially overbroad.
Alternatively, the court could have explicitly recognized the two-
tier approach applied by traditional speech cases, rather than trying
to wedge the speech interest into an arbitrary, illusory category.
Under the two-tier approach, a provision "aimed entirely at harms
unconnected with the content of any communication, may be invalid if
it leaves too little breathing space for communicative activity, or
leaves people with too little access to channels of communication,
183. Id.
184. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
185. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
186. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 924 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996).
187. Id. at 942-43.
188. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
190. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 943.
191. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
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whether as would-be speakers or as would-be listeners." 192 The court
balances the values, interests or rights asserted by the government in
support of the restriction against the extent to which communicative
activity is inhibited. In other words, the court balances the govern-
ment justifications for Article XXVIII against the burden on
Yniguez's free speech rights. Rather than obscuring the issue in the
mire of speech/conduct analysis, the court should have explicitly rec-
ognized the balancing approach as applicable to public employee lan-
guage rights issues. Ultimately, this is the approach the majority
takes, albeit implicitly.
Conclusion
By attempting to classify Yniguez's speech interest as either pure
speech or expressive conduct at the outset, the majority was distracted
by an erroneous line of reasoning from which it was unable to recover.
Subsequent efforts to analyze the public employee speech doctrine
failed as well, due to misapplication of precedent and unnecessary fo-
cus on an irrelevant public versus private concern content distinction.
The patent failure to clearly identify the speech interest at issue led to
continued difficulty in determining the applicable standard of review.
Despite examining three reasonable alternatives, the majority failed
to determine which applied. The result is a decision that fails to iden-
tify what type of speech language rights restrictions fall into and what
level of scrutiny English-only provisions will be held to. Because of
this failure, the issue will remain, for all intents and purposes, one of
first impression for the next court faced with adjudicating the constitu-
tionality of an English-only provision.
This result could have been avoided. Whether the court chose to
focus on Article XXVIII's chilling effect on third parties or whether it
felt compelled to address Yniguez's speech interest, sufficient means
existed to determine the constitutionality of Article XXVIII in such a
manner as to provide at the very least some semblance of direction or
guidance to legislators and lower courts, while still remaining true to
precedent. Sadly, the Yniguez decision failed to do either.
192. TRIBE, supra note 81, § 12-23, at 978.

